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Tobacco use is a signiﬁcant risk factor for the leading causes of death worldwide, including cancer, heart
disease and stroke. Most of these deaths occur in low- and middle-income countries, where tobacco-
related deaths are also rising rapidly. Taxation is one of the most effective tobacco control measures,
yet evidence on the distributional impact of tobacco taxation in low- and middle-income countries re-
mains scant. This paper considers the ﬁnancial and health effects, by socio-economic class, of increasing
tobacco taxes in Lebanon, a middle-income country.
An Almost Ideal Demand System is used to estimate price elasticities of demand for tobacco products.
Extended cost-effectiveness analysis (ECEA) methods are applied to quantify, across quintiles of socio-
economic status, the health beneﬁts gained, the additional tax revenues raised, and the net ﬁnancial
consequences for households from a 50% increase in the price of tobacco through excise taxes. We ﬁnd
that demand for tobacco is price inelastic with elasticities ranging from 0.32 for the poorest quintile
to 0.22 for the richest quintile. The increase in tobacco tax is estimated to result in 65,000 (95% CI:
37,000e93,000) premature deaths averted, 25% of them in the poorest quintile, $300M ($256e340M) of
additional tax revenues, 12% borne by the poorest quintile, $23M ($13e33M) of out-of-pocket spending
on healthcare averted, 36% of which accrue to the poorest quintile, 9% to the richest. These savings would
be associated with 23,000 (13,000e33,000) poverty cases averted (63% in the poorest quintile).
Increasing tobacco taxes would lead to large ﬁnancial and health beneﬁts, and would be pro-poor in
health gains, savings on healthcare, and poverty reduction.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are the leading cause of
death worldwide, and the vast majority of NCD deaths now occur in
low- and middle-income countries (Alwan et al., 2010; Murray
et al., 2015). Half of NCD-related deaths occur during the prime
productive years of adulthood, resulting in substantial societal costs
that extend beyond health service delivery (Bloom et al., 2011).
Tobacco is a signiﬁcant risk factor for NCDs including cardio-
vascular disease, cancer and stroke. The World Health Organization
(WHO) puts an estimate of the annual economic burden of tobacco-
related illnesses at over $500 billion, which exceeds total annual
health expenditures in low- and middle-income countries (WHO,r Ltd. This is an open access article2014b). Without signiﬁcant intervention, the number of tobacco-
related deaths in low- and middle-income countries is projected
to reach 7 million deaths per year by 2030, doubling the level of
2010 (NCD Alliance, 2011).
As a middle-income country, Lebanon is no exception to these
trends. NCDs are the country's main killer, with ischemic heart
disease alone accounting for over 30% of all deaths (IHME, 2013).
Lebanon's disease burden is undoubtedly related to its smoking
prevalence and intensity, which are among the highest in the
Middle East and the highest for women in the Arab world (Salti
et al., 2014; WHO, 2013). Average smoking prevalence rates are
around 43% for men and 28% for women, and these rates have been
consistently rising for decades (Sibai and Hwalla, 2010). Tobacco
consumption increased by an alarming 475% between 1990 and
2012, which ultimately put annual consumption of cigarettes at
2400 per capita, three times the world average (Al-Akhbar English,
2013). In 2008, studies estimated that tobacco consumption costunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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to 1% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in that year
(Salti et al., 2014). We estimate that total spending on tobacco
products in the Lebanesemarket is even larger at $850million (CAS,
2005; National Customs Authority, 2012), just under 2% of GDP.
Despite tobacco's negative impact on both population health
and the economy, the Lebanese government has not fully used the
policy tools at its disposal to stem the epidemic. In 2011, pursuant
to its ratiﬁcation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
in 2005, the Lebanese parliament passed Law 174 to control the
consumption of tobacco products. Speciﬁcally, the law prohibits
smoking in indoor public spaces, bans advertising of tobacco
products, andmandates the inclusion of text and pictorial warnings
on tobacco packaging. Unfortunately, the enforcement of the law
has been patchy at best, particularly in the area of the control of
smoking in public places (Al-Akhbar English, 2014). Tobacco tax
rates in Lebanon are also suboptimal at about 47% of the retail price
for imported cigarettes; the World Health Organization recom-
mends tobacco taxes be at least 70% of the retail price (WHO, 2010).
Tobacco products are also comparatively affordable in Lebanon.
Using the fraction of GDP per capita required to purchase 100 packs
of the most sold brand of cigarettes as an indicator, tobacco prod-
ucts aremore affordable in Lebanon than in neighboring or regional
countries, including Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, or the West Bank and
Gaza (WHO, 2015).
Some studies have looked at the consumption and revenue ef-
fects of raising tobacco taxes in Lebanon (Salti et al., 2015) and other
LMICs (Levy et al., 2006; Blecher, 2011a), however these analyses
fail to capture broader economic and health beneﬁts. In this paper,
we conduct an extended cost-effectiveness analysis (ECEA)
(Verguet et al., 2015a, 2015b, 2015c) to examine the distributional
consequences and household ﬁnancial and health beneﬁts (per
socio-economic group) of a hypothetical increase in the excise tax
on tobacco in Lebanon.
2. Methods
ECEA methods are described in Verguet et al. (2015b), and
particularly in the context of tobacco tax in Verguet et al. (2015a).
Health policy instruments such as public ﬁnance or taxation of
tobacco products entail consequences in multiple domains.
Fundamentally, they aim at leading to better health beneﬁts (e.g.
mortality averted), but these policies can also provide non-health
beneﬁts. For instance, tobacco taxes can prevent illness-related
impoverishment and provide ﬁnancial risk protection. Further-
more, they can improve the distribution of health in the population.
ECEA is meant to evaluate the health and ﬁnancial consequences of
policies in the following three domains: the health gains, the
ﬁnancial risk protection beneﬁts, and the distributional (e.g. across
socio-economic groups) beneﬁts. In this study, we draw closely on
the approach used by Verguet et al. (2015a) and conduct an ECEA to
examine the household health and ﬁnancial beneﬁts, and overall
distributional consequences of increasing the tobacco excise tax in
Lebanon.
First, we identify the price elasticities by age and income groups.
We simulate the effect of an increase in the tobacco excise tax on: i)
the change in out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditures on cigarettes, ii)
the change in government revenue, iii) premature deaths averted,
iv) the change in OOP expenditures on tobacco-related diseases,
and v) associated poverty cases averted. All of these outcomes are
estimated for the current population of smokers. We then use
sensitivity analysis to test our ﬁndings with regards to potential
substitute tobacco products. In Appendix 5 of the supplementary
materials, we also translate the result on premature deaths averted
into life years gained.2.1. Group-based price elasticities
The price of most tobacco products is regulated by the Regie, the
state-run monopoly in charge of regulating the market for tobacco,
and the Ministry of Finance (Tobacco Fact in Lebanon, (2001)).
Using $2.15 as the average price of a pack of imported cigarettes
(Mahdi, 2014), we estimate the effect on current smokers of an
increase in the excise tax that results in a 50% increase in the retail
price of imported cigarettes. The analysis focuses solely on im-
ported cigarettes as they represented about 90% of household
spending on tobacco in 2005, and 75% of total cigarettes smoked
(Chaaban et al., 2010).
The magnitude of the price increase of 50% is chosen because it
would be a politically feasible change in tax. Because, as stated
above, the Regie sets the retail price, the excise tax, and the proﬁt
margins of the distributors and retailers, the Regie also effectively
controls the pass-through rates. At the current ratio of taxes to price
for imported cigarettes (which is 47%), for instance, the Regie could
decide to increase the price by 50% by increasing taxes. At the
average price of $2.15 per pack, if the price increase of $1.075 were
collected in additional taxes, the resulting tax would be closer to
65% of the new price. In the sensitivity analysis reported in
Appendix 4 of the supplementary materials, we also look at the
outcomes under different scenarios of price increases.
We use data from the Ministry of Public Health from 2011 to
summarize population size and the relative sizes of age cohorts,
focusing on individuals 15 and older (Ministry of Public Health of
Lebanon (2011)). We have prevalence data by 10-year age groups
(IHME, 2013; Sibai and Hwalla, 2010; Global Youth Tobacco Survey
Country Factsheet for Lebanon, 2011) and by income quintile
(National Household Health Expenditure and Use Survey, 1999). In
order to obtain prevalence ﬁgures by both quintile and age group,
we use prevalence by age group to calculate the total number of
smokers in each age group. For each age group, we then allocate
these smokers to quintiles by assuming that the distribution of
smokers across quintiles is the same for each age group.
Demand elasticity for tobacco is estimated using primary data
on household consumption from a nationally representative survey
from 2005 (CAS, 2005), and an Almost Ideal Demand System
(AIDS). The methodology is described in detail in Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980) and Deaton (1990). We use spatial variation in
relative prices to estimate elasticities: the Central Administration
for Statistics releases price indexes for each of a number of con-
sumables by district. Price variation in the AIDS model comes from
geographical differences in these price indexes (Deaton, 1990). The
AIDS model consists in running a constrained regression of the
share of imported cigarettes in total household expenditures on a
vector of prices. Elasticities are computed as nonlinear functions of
the regression coefﬁcients. The standard errors of the elasticities
are then calculated using the delta method (by taking a ﬁrst order
Taylor series approximation) (Hosmer et al., 2008). These elastici-
ties are estimated separately for each quintile. Appendix 7 of the
supplementary materials shows the detailed regression results that
yield these elasticity estimates. Quintiles are deﬁned using house-
hold annual expenditures per adult equivalent, using data from the
same household survey (CAS, 2005). The cutoffs for quintiles are
reported in Table 1.
The results, with elasticities ranging between 0.32 and 0.22
over the ﬁve quintiles, are in line with the elasticity of demand for
imported cigarettes estimated at 0.22 in Salti et al. (2015). While
we are able to use our AIDS model to estimate demand elasticities
by quintile, we do not have the data needed to estimate elasticity by
age group or by gender. We assume that the elasticity for those
under 24-years old is twice as large as the elasticity calculated for
the whole population, which is consistent with the evidence
Table 1
Inputs used for the modeling of the increase in tobacco excise tax in Lebanon.
Input Values Data sources
Smoking prevalence by age (%) Male Female GYTS Global Youth Tobacco Survey Country
Factsheet for Lebanon (2011)
Sibai and Hwalla (2010)
IHME (data for the year 2010); Authors' imputation
based on GYTS and Sibai and Hwalla (2010)
Under 15 18 6
15e19 27 13
20e24 38 19
25e34 41 18
35e44 49 33
45e54 55 46
55e64 46 45
65e69 29 21
70e74 31 33
75e79 25 24
80e84 18 19
85þ 18 19
Quintile annual household expenditures (2012
USD) per adult equivalent and smoking
prevalence rates
Expenditures Prevalence Household living conditions survey (2005), inﬂation
(World Development Indicators), National
Household Health Expenditures and Use Survey
(NHHEUS) 1999 (data for 1996)
Q1 $1604 28
Q2 $2589 28
Q3 $3557 27
Q4 $4943 25
Q5 $9329 22
Imported cigarettes (in millions of 2012 USD) 339 Customs data, 2012
Expenditures on imported cigarettes by quintile
(millions of 2012 USD)
Q1 104 Authors' calculations based on: data on total value
of imported cigarettes in 2012 (customs data);
share of each quintile in spending by product
calculated using 2005 household survey data (CAS,
2005).
Q2 151
Q3 163
Q4 180
Q5 196
Total 794
Price of imported cigarettes (per pack, 2012 USD) $2.15
Share of tax in price, imported cigarettes 47% Authors' calculations based on Ministry of Finance
data (Mahdi, 2014)
Distribution of tobacco-related diseasemortality, by
cause (%)
COPD 6% Global Burden of Disease study (IHME, 2013)
Lung cancer 13%
Stroke 19%
Ischemic heart disease 55%
Hypertensive heart disease 3%
Bladder cancer 3%
Reduction in mortality risk by age at quitting
smoking
15e24 98% Doll et al., 2004
25e44 85%
45e64 75%
65þ 25%
Utilization rates of healthcare services by tobacco-
related disease
Hypertensive 21% Authors' calculations (detailed in the data
appendix)Ischemic 43%
Cerebrovascular 29%
Respiratory neoplasms 49%
Urinary neoplasms 7%
Respiratory 26%
Utilization rates of healthcare services conditional
on reporting a health problem (standardized to
use Quintile 3 as a reference)
Q1 0.95 Authors' calculations based on NHHEUS 1996
Q2 0.95
Q3 1
Q4 1.01
Q5 1.08
Hospitalization cost by tobacco-related disease
(2012 USD)
COPD $951 National Social Security Fund (NSSF) data in Karam
(2014). NSSF data is categorized as “Cardiovascular”,
“Neoplasm” or “Other”.
Lung cancer $2227
Stroke $951
Ischemic $1466
Hypertensive $1466
Bladder cancer $2227
Fraction of healthcare costs paid out-of-pocket by
quintile
Q1 83% Coverage rates from Salti et al. (2010), including
reimbursement ratesQ2 70%
Q3 60%
Q4 49%
Q5 35%
Poverty line of expenditures (2012 USD) per person
per day
$4 International poverty center, 2008
Poverty rate 29% International poverty center, 2008
COPD, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
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Development Bank (2012). In the same vein, Levy et al. (2006)
ﬁnd higher elasticities of demand for youth in Vietnam, and Salti
et al. (2015) ﬁnd that demand for tobacco by households with
younger heads is more elastic. Quintile-based elasticities obtained
from the AIDS model are applied to all age groups above 25, and
doubled for the younger age group.
2.2. Out-of-pocket tobacco expenditures and change in government
revenue
Starting with current expenditures on tobacco by quintile, we
use these estimated quintile-based elasticities to calculate the ef-
fect of a price change on each quintile's expenditures on tobacco
(CAS, 2005; National Customs Authority, 2012). The tax will induce
some smokers to quit, so these additional expenditures on tobacco
are borne by continuing smokers in each quintile. Estimating
changes in OOP expenditures on tobacco by consumers also allows
us to estimate the change in taxes paid by each quintile. We are
thereby able to calculate the change in tax revenue to the
government.
To look at distributional consequences, after dividing the results
by quintile population to get per capita ﬁgures, we scale the ﬁnd-
ings to the level of the average total household expenditures per
adult equivalent in each quintile. This allows us to report in Table 3
the change in tobacco expenditures as a share of total household
expenditures per adult equivalent for each quintile.
We check the robustness of our estimates of the distributional
consequences of this change in expenditures by looking in Fig. 1 at
the effects on this relative share of household expenditures on to-
bacco of different magnitudes of price increases, ranging from 10%
to 100%.
2.3. Premature deaths averted
To calculate deaths averted from an increase in the price of
cigarettes, we assume that half of the price elasticity of demand
estimated is an elasticity of participation, a standard assumption inFig. 1. Share of expenditures on imported cigarettes in total houthe literature based on ﬁndings in several countries (WHO, 2010;
Verguet et al., 2015a; IARC, 2011; Lewit and Coate, 1982; Mullahy,
1985; Wasserman et al., 1991; Evans and Farrelly, 1998). In the
case of Lebanon, this participation elasticity for smoking is calcu-
lated as half the price elasticity of demand for imported cigarettes,
since these account for an overwhelmingly large share of the
market, as mentioned above. Quitters for each age-quintile group
are then directly calculated from the participation elasticity and the
increase in cigarette price that results from the tax. The price
change would also result in reduced tobacco consumption among
continuing smokers, but we do not include the health beneﬁts for
this reduced intensity of smoking in our estimates of health gains.
Only deaths averted from quitting are taken into consideration in
our estimation of health beneﬁts. Doll et al. (2004) estimates of the
effect on the reduced relative risk of death by age at quitting were
used (Table 1). Deaths averted by quitting for each age group are
estimated here as follows: we use a 50-year time frame and assume
that over the next 50 years, half of smokers die of their habit (Doll
et al., 2004). More recent ﬁndings on cohorts aged 45 and above
ﬁnd that as many as two thirds of smokers die from smoking (Banks
et al., 2015), however, we use the more conservative estimates. We
apply this schedule of reduced mortality risk to our estimated
quitters (which differ by age and quintile because of different
prevalence and elasticity by quintile-age group).2.4. Health system and out-of-pocket costs averted
While there are clear immediate and long-term health beneﬁts
from quitting smoking, from a lifetime perspective, smoking
cessation may also be associated with some healthcare costs and
not just healthcare savings, as the years of life gained from quitting
smoking may come with healthcare costs at advanced ages. How-
ever, work by Hodgson (1992), which compares lifetime healthcare
costs for smokers and non-smokers, shows that smokers incur
higher total lifetime healthcare costs. An updated estimation of the
Hodgson results (Boonn, 2014) using 2009 data, and applying the
Centers for Disease Control estimates of the cessation-association
relative reduction in the risk of death, ﬁnds that quitting issehold expenditures by quintile for different price changes.
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Fishman et al. (2003), and by Rasmussen et al. (2005) also shows
that smoking cessation is associated with a reduction in healthcare
costs for quitters, even in the long run. In this study, we do not take
into account any healthcare costs incurred by quitters in the years
of life gained. We focus instead on estimating the savings for the
health system and for the individual quitter associated with the
deaths averted from quitting, keeping in mind the above cited ev-
idence that quitting is associated with long-run healthcare savings
for both the system and the individual. We limit our calculations of
health spending averted to savings on hospitalization costs.
There are 2 main statistics needed to calculate hospitalization
costs saved by quintile due to the deaths averted: the cost of
tobacco-related hospitalizations and the utilization rate of health-
care services by quintile. We detail the estimation of each of these
two measures in turn.
We consider only ﬁve disease groups associated with tobacco
consumption in our calculations of hospitalization costs saved due
to deaths averted. These disease groups are cardiovascular disease,
stroke, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD), lung and
bladder cancers. These diseases combined account for the majority
of tobacco deaths, and data on these diseases is available from the
Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study (IHME, 2013). We use hos-
pitalization costs for each of the ﬁve diseases (Karam, 2014) and
data on the distribution of tobacco-related deaths across these
causes of death (IHME, 2013) to estimate the cost of a tobacco-
related hospitalization.
Utilization rates by diagnosis are estimated as follows: the
Ministry of Public Health provides data by diagnosis on hospitali-
zations covered by the ministry (Ministry of Public Health, 2011).
These data, in conjunction with the fact that the Ministry of Public
Health covers on average 12% of hospitalizations (UNDP, 1997), are
used to obtain total annual hospitalizations for these diagnosis
groups. As detailed in Appendix 1 of the supplementary materials,
we calculate utilization rates by comparing these imputed total
hospitalizations per year for each diagnosis to the prevalence rates
of the ﬁve disease groups (WHO, 2014a; Jurjus et al., 2009;
American Lung Association, Schneider et al., 2007; American
Cancer Society). We thus obtain disease-speciﬁc utilization rates
for the whole income scale.
In order to estimate hospitalizations by quintile, we need
quintile-based utilization rates. From the NHHEUS, we have data on
utilization rates by quintile for any healthcare service, conditional
on having a health condition (National Household Health
Expenditure and Use Survey, 1999). These utilization rates are
normalized using the middle quintile as a base and scaling the
utilization rates of other quintiles as relative utilization compared
to the middle quintile. We apply to the disease-speciﬁc utilization
rates the relative utilization rates of hospitalizations by quintile to
obtain the utilization rate of hospitalization services by disease/
quintile group. The health system savings on hospitalization costs
are calculated for each quintile by multiplying the deaths averted
by the average cost of a smoking-related hospitalization and the
utilization rates by quintile and by disease. Subsequently, we derive
the savings in OOP health expenditures using the share of health-
care costs paid out of pocket by expenditure quintile, reported in
Table 1 (Salti et al., 2010). OOP health expenditures averted are
calculated keeping in mind that insurance plans cover acute health
expenditures associated with hospitalizations due to tobacco-
related illnesses, and patients without insurance coverage pay out
of pocket. We assume that quitters in each quintile have the same
insurance coverage rate as the overall quintile. In each quintile, we
estimate OOP expenditures by applying to the hospitalization costs
incurred by the quintile (described above) the insurance coverage
rate of the same quintile.2.5. Cases of poverty averted
OOP health expenditures averted by quintile are then used to
estimate the number of poverty cases averted. The reasoning
here is that for some quitters, money they would have spent on
healthcare is now made available to spend on consumption. We
assume that these health savings raise expenditures, and there-
fore lift the individuals' position relative to the poverty line. The
World Bank puts the poverty line for Lebanon at $4 of spending
per person per day in 2008. Adjusted for inﬂation using World
Bank estimates of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) deﬂator, the poverty line stands at $5.5
in 2012. The poverty headcount estimated by the Ministry of
Social Affairs is 29% of the population and the poverty gap is 9%
(International Poverty Center, 2008). With a poverty rate of 29%,
all of the bottom quintile is below the poverty line, and 40% of
the second quintile is poor. These ﬁgures are consistent with our
ﬁndings for average household consumption per capita, which
stand at below the poverty line for the lowest quintile and above
it for the second quintile. We assume that deaths averted in the
second quintile are uniformly distributed over the quintile, so
that the incidence of poverty among quitters from the second
quintile is the same as the incidence of poverty of the overall
quintile (at 40%). So for the second quintile, in order to estimate
the effect of the OOP health savings on poverty, we consider the
40% of quitters from the second quintile that fall below the
poverty line before the tax increase. Because we do not know the
effect on OOP health spending of reducing the intensity of
smoking for continuing smokers, we do not estimate the effect of
the tax on the poverty status of smokers who continue to
consume tobacco after the tax. It is likely, therefore, that our
analysis underestimates the true beneﬁts of an increase in to-
bacco tax rate.2.6. Sensitivity analysis
We run a number of sensitivity tests of our main results that
allow us to check the sensitivity of our results to some of the
simplifying assumptions made and to investigate the robustness of
the main ﬁndings to extensions in the types of tobacco products
consumed and the choice of parameters.
The results pertaining to the distribution of outcomes are ob-
tained under a number of assumptions which we re-examine in
turn: we ﬁrst reconsider the assumption about the elasticity of
younger consumers, and report the results in Appendix 2 of the
supplementary materials, we then vary the assumption about the
share of participation in the elasticity of demand for cigarettes and
report the results in Appendix 3 of the supplementary materials.
We expand our analysis of the effect of tobacco taxes on tax
revenues and household expenditures on tobacco by quintile to
include three tobacco products: in addition to imported cigarettes,
considered in the main analysis, we now also look at locally pro-
duced cigarettes and waterpipe (or hookah) tobacco. We use the
same AIDS model to calculate own- and cross-price elasticities for
all three tobacco products in Lebanon and we estimate these
separately by expenditure quintile. We then estimate the resulting
tax revenue and household expenditures on tobacco while taking
into account possible substitutions across tobacco products. This
extension is reported in Appendix 4 of the supplementary
materials.
We also consider different scenarios for the increase in taxes,
including a 25% and a 100% increase in retail price.
The AIDS model is run using STATA 12.0. All data on inputs are
shown in Table 1.
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Table 2 shows point estimates for own-price elasticity of de-
mand for imported cigarettes. It also shows 95% conﬁdence in-
tervals for the elasticities. Demand is inelastic for the entire range
of the 95% conﬁdence interval for each quintile. The point estimates
of elasticities are monotonically increasing as we move from richer
to poorer socio-economic groups, ranging from 0.32 (95%
CI 0.47:0.18) for the poorest quintile to 0.22 (0.31:0.14) for
the richest. This inverse relationship between the sensitivity of
demand and socio-economic status is in line with the ﬁndings in
the literature. Regressions in the AIDS model are run separately for
each quintile. Each elasticity estimate is based on a regression for
1045 households in that quintile. The full details of the regressions
are reported in Appendix 7 of the supplementary materials.
Tobacco expenditures increase for all expenditure quintiles,
however the magnitude of this increase is relative. When scaled to
household expenditures per adult equivalent, this extra spending
on tobacco products amounts to 2.1% (CI: 1.2%e2.9%) of total
household expenditures per adult equivalent for the poorest
expenditure quintile, and 0.9% (CI: 0.7%e1%) for the top quintile.
This additional burden falls on continuing smokers in each quintile.
The distribution across expenditure quintiles of the added ex-
penditures on cigarettes is different depending on the level of
cigarette price increase. Fig. 1 shows the size of the increase in
spending on cigarettes scaled to household expenditures per adult
equivalent for each quintile, and tracks this ratio for different levels
of price increases ranging from10 to 100%. The ﬁgure shows that for
relatively large increases in price, the effect on expenditures on
cigarettes as a share of total household expenditures per adult
equivalent peaks for the second poorest quintile. For price increases
in the middle range (25%e45%), the effect on the poorest and sec-
ond quintiles is similar, and larger than for the wealthier quintiles.
For smaller price increase, the added share of household expendi-
tures per adult equivalent devoted to cigarettes is highest for the
poorest quintile and decreases monotonically over the income
scale. These results are driven by the underlying distribution of
household expenditures per adult equivalent as well as the quintile
differences in smoking prevalence and elasticities.
A direct implication of the increased overall expenditures on
tobacco is an increase in government revenue. We simulate a 50%
increase in price that is entirely levied by the government, since the
Regie regulates the tobacco market. The price increase would result
in higher tax revenues by close to $300 million per year (95% CI:
$256M-$340M), which represents an 80% (95% CI: 68%e91%) in-
crease in tax revenues from imported cigarettes. Nearly 26% of the
extra tax burden is ﬁnanced by the richest quintile while only 12% is
borne by the poorest.
In Table 3, we examined the premature deaths averted among
current smokers over the course of their lifetime. A 50% increase in
the price of tobacco would avert close to 65,000 premature deaths
from among estimated quitters (95% CI: 37,000e93,000), over 25%Table 2
Results from application of the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model.
Price elasticity of demand for imported tobacco by income quintile (95%
conﬁdence interval)
Q1 (poorest) 0.32 (0.47 0.18)
Q2 0.27 (0.36 0.17)
Q3 0.26 (0.40 0.12)
Q4 0.24 (0.34 0.14)
Q5 (richest) 0.22 (0.31 0.14)
Source: authors' calculations from AIDS model applied to data from national survey
of living conditions of households (2005) [11]. Full regression results from the AIDS
model available upon request from the authors.of which accrue to the poorest expenditure quintile. The distribu-
tion of deaths averted ismonotonically progressivewith only 14% of
deaths averted from the richest expenditure quintile. In the sensi-
tivity analysis, we re-examine this result while loosening the
assumption about a higher elasticity of demand for the youth. The
deaths averted are, unsurprisingly, slightly lower when the elas-
ticity is assumed to be age-invariant, ranging from 13,500 (95% CI:
7600e19,800) in the poorest quintile to 7500 (95% CI:
4700e10,500) in the richest, but the overall distribution of deaths
averted remains progressive across all 5 quintiles. Themagnitude of
the ﬁndings on deaths averted is also sensitive to the assumption
about the share of participation in the overall elasticity of demand,
but again, the pattern observed on the distribution of deaths
averted over quintiles is qualitatively robust to the fraction of
elasticity attributed to participation (Appendix 3 of the supple-
mentary materials).
The deaths averted are associated with savings on health
spending estimated at almost $37 million (95% CI: 21M-53M),
which amounts to close to $22 million in household OOP savings.
Scaled to the total number of smokers, these ﬁgures represent
around $41 of health care system savings per smoker per year, or
around $26 of OOP savings per smoker per year. Of the household
OOP savings, 36% accrue to the poorest quintile while only 9% are
for the richest. These savings represent close to 0.6% (95% CI: 0.3%e
0.9%) of household expenditures by adult equivalent for the poorest
quintile. In appendix 6 of the supplementary materials, these sav-
ings are shown in net present value, discounted over 50 years
(assuming they accrue for each cohort when the quitter reaches life
expectancy) using a 3% per year discount rate. Whenwe assume no
difference between the elasticity of younger and older cohorts,
these savings are slightly smaller in size, as expected, but their
distribution across quintiles remains qualitatively unchanged both
for total health system savings as well as OOP savings for house-
holds (Appendix 2 of the supplementary materials).
OOP healthcare spending on tobacco-related diseases can have
an impoverishing effect and push households below the poverty
line. We estimate the number of poverty cases averted from a 50%
price increase on imported cigarettes at close to 27,000 individuals
(13,000e32,000), 63% of whom would be in the poorest quintile.
This represents 2.0% of all people in the poorest quintile and around
1.2% of people in the second poorest quintile. When the elasticities
for young and old are assumed to be the same, the poverty impli-
cations of the tax increase are again qualitatively unchanged, as
shown in Appendix 2 of the supplementary materials: even when
health expenditures averted are smaller, they are sufﬁcient per
quitter to lift above the poverty line all quitters with a household
consumption per capita equal to the quintile average for the lowest
quintile. For the second quintile, if we maintain the assumption
that the average household consumption spending per capita of
quitters is uniformly distributed over the quintile, then the 40% of
quitters who are below the poverty line before the tax beneﬁt from
sufﬁcient health savings to push them out of poverty.
4. Discussion
Lebanon is currently one of the cheapest places to buy both
imported and local cigarettes in the Arab region: as mentioned
above, cigarettes are less affordable in Jordan, Egypt, Turkey,
Cyprus, and the West Bank and Gaza (WHO, 2015). With taxes
totaling only 47% of the price (Mahdi, 2014), there is hence sub-
stantial room to increase these taxes.
Our price elasticity ﬁndings fall on the more inelastic end of the
range of estimates for other middle-income countries, with Egypt
at0.27 to0.82 (Nassar, 2003), Turkey at0.41 (Onder, 2002) and
South Africa at 0.46 (Blecher, 2011b). These are also similar to the
Table 3
The impact of a 50% increase in the price of imported cigarettes on health, spending and tax revenues (95% conﬁdence interval).
Q1 (poorest) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (richest) Total
Premature deaths averted 17,000 (9400
e24,600)
14,400 (9000
e19,000)
13,300 (6100
e21,000)
11,000 (6500
e16,000)
9000 (6000
e13,000)
65,000 (37,000
e93,000)
Additional excise tax revenues in millions of USD 36 (28e43) 56 (49e63) 60 (50e72) 69 (60e78) 77 (69e85) 300 (256e341)
% of total borne by quintile 12.0% 18.6% 20.4% 23.1% 25.8%
% of household expenditures/adult equivalent 2.8% 2.7% 2.1% 1.7% 1.0% 1.7%
Change in expenditures on tobacco products (in millions of
USD)
27 (15e38) 45 (35e56) 50 (33e67) 58 (44e71) 66 (52e77) 245 (179e310)
% of household expenditures/adult equivalent 2.1% (1.2%e2.9%) 2.1% (1.7%e2.7%) 1.7% (1.1%e2.3%) 1.4% (1.1%e1.8%) 0.9% (0.7%
e1.0%)
1.4% (1.0%e1.7%)
Expenditures on tobacco-related disease treatment averted
(in millions of USD)
9 (5e13) 8 (5e10) 8 (4e12) 6 (4e8) 5 (4e8) 37 (21e53)
Out-of-pocket expenditures averted by households (in
millions of USD)
8 (4e11) 5 (3e7) 4 (2e7) 3 (2e4) 2 (1e3) 22 (13e33)
% of all savings accruing to Q 36% 23% 18% 14% 9%
% of household expenditures/adult equivalent 0.60% (0.30
e0.86%)
0.20% (0.16
e0.35%)
0.10% (0.07
e0.24%)
0.07% (0.05
e0.11%)
0.02% (0.01
e0.04%)
0.10% (0.07
e0.18%)
Poverty cases averted 17,000 (9400
e24,600)
9800 (3600
e7600)
0 0 0 26,800 (13,000
e32,200)
Fraction of Q moving out of poverty 2.0% 1.2% e e e e
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that use an AIDS approach ﬁnd elasticities on the order of 0.53 for
Vietnam (Eozenou and Fishburn, 2009).
Tobacco taxation is a well-established measure for decreasing
tobacco consumption (Levy et al., 2006; Blecher, 2011a,b; IARC,
2011). While some studies have looked at the distributional
impact of raising tobacco taxes in high-income settings (Colman
and Remler, 2008; Warner, 2000; Chaloupka and Warner, 2000)
and found mixed results, few studies have considered the distri-
butional consequences and equity of such measures (Verguet et al.,
2015a). This study adds to the literature by examining the effect of
an increase in the excise tax on tobacco in Lebanon by quintile.
In this paper, we look at ﬁve outcomes, by expenditure quintile,
of a 50% increase in tobacco price. We ﬁnd that nearly 65,000
deaths are averted, over 25% of which are from the poorest quintile.
Health gains are progressively distributed, with a larger advantage
accruing to the poorer quintiles. We estimate that $37 million of
health expenditures are averted, $22 million of them paid out of
pocket by households. Of these, 36% are saved by the poorest
quintile. Rehm et al. (2006) ﬁnd that hospitalizations constitute
56% of total economic costs of tobacco in Canada. Using the same
cost breakdown, our ﬁndings of $37 million in savings from averted
hospitalizations would be associated with around $246 million in
total economic savings, including productivity losses averted. Using
ﬁndings from similar research in the UK (ASH, 2015) would put a
lower bound on total economic savings associated with the averted
hospitalizations at $270 million.
The health expenditures averted result in 17,000 cases of
poverty averted in the poorest quintile. The total number of poverty
cases averted is close to 27,000, around 2.3% of the poverty
headcount.
The effects on health spending and the resulting poverty
reduction are therefore also pro-poor. When we compare the
fraction of deaths averted and the fraction of the total tax burden
accruing to the lowest quintile, our results are in line with some of
the ﬁndings in the literature: a study by the Asian Development
Bank (2012) ﬁnds that the beneﬁt to tax ratio for groups with the
lowest socioeconomic status for a 50% price increase is around 1.4
for Vietnam, 1.5 for India and 1.9 for the Philippines. The ratio we
obtain for Lebanon is 2.2.
Household expenditures on tobacco would increase by $245
million, 11% of which are spent by the poorest quintile and 27% by
the richest. As a fraction of total household expenditures, however,
the additional spending on tobacco is a larger share of householdexpenditures for poor quintiles (2.1%) than that of rich quintiles
(0.9%). Tax revenues increase by close to $300 million. 12% of the
additional tax burden is borne by the poorest quintile, and over 26%
is ﬁnanced by the richest quintile, ﬁnanced entirely by continuing
smokers in each quintile.
The distribution of additional expenditures on tobacco as a
fraction of household expenditures is linked to several factors: the
differences in the prevalence of smoking across quintiles, the dif-
ferences in elasticities across quintiles, and the underlying degree
of inequality in household expenditures across quintiles. The dis-
tribution of the additional burden of tobacco expenditures is also
sensitive to the magnitude of the change in price. Larger price
changes result in changes in the share of tobacco in household
expenditures that are more pro-poor among the poorest 2 quin-
tiles, but they remain less of a burden in terms of relative expen-
ditures in the upper tail of the distribution (Fig. 1).
The difference between total and OOP savings on healthcare is in
the form of savings accruing to the health system. These savings,
along with the additional tax revenue (which is estimated to be of
very largemagnitude), give ﬁscal authorities a lot of room to correct
any adverse distributional effects of additional expenditures on
tobacco, particularly on continuing smokers in the lowest quintiles.
Distributional considerations provide a more nuanced under-
standing of how tobacco taxation affects a population and should
therefore be taken into account in any tobacco control policy. The
results in this paper show that when several outcomes are
considered collectively, raising taxes on tobaccowould have several
pro-poor results.
Nevertheless, we rely on a series of assumptions. Our estimates
of health gains are a conservative lower bound because of ﬁve
simplifying assumptions: i) we only consider the health gains that
accrue to quitters, and we exclude health gains that come from a
reduction in the intensity of smoking for continuing smokers; ii) we
underestimate quitters as we calculate them based only on the
elasticity of demand for imported cigarettes and ignore, in this
calculation, the other two tobacco goods we consider, which have
far more elastic demand; iii) we exclude health gains from reduced
exposure to second-hand smoke; iv) we only look at deaths averted
and do not take into account other improvements in health; and v)
we assume that all quintiles have similar age compositions, and
that quintile differences in smoking prevalence are similar for each
age cohort, when in fact the differences are likely driven by a higher
concentration of younger age cohorts in poorer quintiles, which
would mean larger health beneﬁts thanwe estimate. Our estimates
N. Salti et al. / Social Science & Medicine 170 (2016) 161e169168of the related savings on health care spending are also conservative
since we also only look at hospitalization costs, only for deaths
averted and only for the ﬁve disease groups considered. We ignore
other health spending and other cases of health gains.
The price measures recommended in the Framework Conven-
tion on Tobacco Control and the tax share of price advocated by the
World Health Organization all point to the health and public rev-
enue beneﬁts of increasing taxes on tobacco products. In this study,
we look further into the distribution of these two beneﬁts and show
that raising taxes on tobacco is pro-poor in health gains and the
resulting poverty cases averted. We also ﬁnd that the sheer
magnitude of additional tax revenues in addition to the health
system savings in the case of Lebanon are larger than any loss from
the burden of additional relative spending on tobacco products that
poorer continuing smokers may suffer from as a result of the tax,
and these added tax revenues would therefore be sufﬁcient to
compensate poorer consumers through cessation programs, assis-
tance in health care spending or other cash assistance policies
targeted at smokers in the lowest quintiles.
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